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China's Striking Anti-corruption Adventure: 
A Political Journey Towards the Rule of Law?
1
 
China is a high-corruption country and the ruling Communist Party (“the Party”) has 
made anti-corruption enforcement a top priority. China is also well known for her 
authoritarian decisiveness in policy making and her effectiveness in policy 
implementation with a centralized political control contrasting sharply with a 
decentralized economic policy. This chapter examines two key aspects of this 
formulation. First, how has the authoritarian characteristic affected China’s 
anticorruption enforcement; and, second, how is China different from other countries, 
authoritarian or otherwise, in this regard?   
There has been an on-going debate between a “convergence theory” and a “divergence 
theory” on China’s political-legal development. According to the convergence story, 
nations differ in their level of legal development largely because of the different levels of 
economic growth. China is significantly different from high-income countries because 
China, as a middle-income country, lacks resources and capacity to support an advanced 
system. 
2
 But as China progresses economically, social and legal changes are bound to 
follow. Consequently, gaps in the legal system will be filled, and the distance between a 
mature legal system and an emerging legal system will be narrowed. Substantive 
convergence is the destination of all legal systems even though it may appear in different 
forms. There is an incremental trajectory along which nations develop their legal system, 
in a thin sense, and, while sequencing in a certain sense may be important,
3
 all nations 
can achieve that trajectory once the necessary conditions are present. In the anti-
corruption field, the Party proves to be resolute and innovative in designing anti-
corruption strategies and has demonstrated both the will and ability to put corruption 
under effective control by resorting to measures that are not fundamentally different from 
international best practices.
4
  
While the divergence theory has a long spectrum of arguments, its central argument is 
that China has a unique system that renders convergence impossible. In Minxin Pei’s 
cynical formulation of a “trap thesis”,5 China’s political model suffers from fatal flaws 
and is not self-correcting. Following a liberal line of conceptualization, Pei argues that, 
without meaningful political competition, separation of powers, independent legal 
institutions and active participation from the civil society, China is unlikely to overcome 
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its corruption problem that is inherent in the authoritarian system. As a result, the regime 
becomes increasingly fragile structurally as it sinks deeper into a trap. Any incremental 
reform, which may prolong regime survival, cannot lead to a fundamental political 
transformation. Consequently, Pei provides a provocative and dim view of political 
corruption in China. He concludes that corruption will continue to entrench itself and the 
anti-corruption mechanisms that rely on the Party’s internal disciplinary framework, 
without the support of law and legal institutions, will not be able to stop the further 
spread of the trend. As a result the regime must collapse on its own weight before any 
transformation can occur. Pei’s trap thesis has been shared by many others who, in 
various ways, present a China-collapse thesis.  
Others have turned Pei’s thesis on its head and argued that what appears to be fatal for 
Pei is precisely where China’s strength lies and contributes to China’s authoritarian 
resilience.
6
 Striking a positive note, many have argued that, instead of converging into a 
Western political model, China may have discovered a distinct development model based 
on its effective and decisive political leadership or communitarian social structure. 
China’s anti-corruption efforts deliver precisely because it is led and controlled by the 
Party at the macro level. This anti-corruption model is legitimate and effective because it 
is embedded within the Chinese reality and the cultural milieu. Seen from this 
perspective, China’s political system, including its anti-corruption regime works 
effectively in these Chinese circumstances.  
This chapter discusses China’s anti-corruption enforcement within the context of the 
convergence/divergence debate and examines the degree to which the Chinese anti-
corruption model converges or diverges from the prevailing “international best practice” 
that is commonly observed in the high income/low corruption countries. Specifically this 
chapter will also discuss whether China could develop an anti-corruption system that 
operates within a rule-based legal framework. The principal argument is that China’s 
anti-corruption practice manifests certain core features that may be unique to the Chinese 
political context and those features show most strikingly at the height of an anti-
corruption campaign. But if we look beyond an exceptional “strike-hard campaign” that 
targets the “tigers”, shift the focus to the more routine enforcement against “flies”, and, in 
particular, observe China’s anti-corruption enforcement for a longer time span, it 
becomes clearer that China does not operate an anticorruption model sui generis. As the 
anti-corruption storm dies down (as it will naturally occur), the enforcement will become 
more routine, regularized, and institutional. When that happens, the Chinese anti-
corruption model, if any, will appear no different from models elsewhere.  
This chapter is divided into five parts. Following this introduction, Part II introduces, in 
broad strokes, the core features of the internal disciplinary inspection committee (jiwei) 
of the Party. Jiwei has come to political prominence in the Xi government and is 
becoming the most powerful force in the Party apparatus. This part explains the political 
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meaning of Party discipline and the core institutional design that renders the mechanism 
effective. Yet, despite the ostensible politicization of anti-corruption, the jiwei 
mechanism shares some core characteristics with the most successful anti-corruption 
stories in other authoritarian systems that one may observe in Hong Kong or Singapore.  
Part III then moves beyond jiwei to study the much marginalized and neglected legal anti-
corruption system in China and its interaction with jiwei. While fundamental differences 
between the two systems remain, they have, over the years, moved closer to one another 
and have the potential to replicate each other’s structure and modus operandi.  
Part VI examines the anti-corruption mechanism from a historical perspective and offers 
insights on the degree to which law is relevant to anti-corruption enforcement. Part V 
concludes this chapter. 
 
I. The Party’s dominance  
The Party’s leadership role is entrenched in the state Constitution. The Party has 
approximately 80 million members, and all key state posts in China are occupied by Party 
members.  
There are different ways to conceptualize Party leadership. For Backer and Wang, 
7
 the 
Party Constitution and the State Constitution are both integral parts of the Chinese 
socialist constitutionalism and the Party is not itself constrained by the state Constitution; 
instead, the Party operates legitimately above and beyond state laws. A more critical view 
simply accepts the political reality that, constitutional or not, the Party dominates the 
political process and can rule directly without transforming the Party’s will into a 
particular form of law. As Zhu Suli and others have argued, the root of China’s 
constitutional order is the rule of the Party, and such political order does not only precede 
the constitutional order in a historical sense but also in the form of the first order rule in a 
political sense.
8
 The Party exercises its leadership through the Constitution and the laws 
made by the law-making body that it controls. While state laws reflect the Party’s will, 
the Party operates within the legal framework it has created. 
Many scholars have moved beyond merely describing the Party’s role in China’s 
constitutional order. These scholars are now treating the Party’s monopoly of political 
power as a key component of an emerging China model and the essence of China’s 
success.
9
 A new generation of scholars has pointed out both the empirical and normative 
dimensions of an entrenched Party leadership, and the normative dimension, in particular, 
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has gained currency in the public debate. Put simply, the Party does not only rule China. 
It should do so.   
Within China’s Leninist Party, political loyalty provides a foundation for the internal 
disciplinary system of the Party. It is a fundamental rule that individual party members 
profess a high degree of, if not absolute, loyalty to the Party. No matter how the Party and 
state relationship is conceptualized, this political system places Party rules over state 
laws, demands the submission of Party members to Party rules and punishes disloyalty or 
split loyalty based on religious belief, professional ethic or other callings. In that Leninist 
tradition, Party members are first and foremost the fabric of the gigantic political 
machinery before they are citizens of the nation. Party members’ loyalty to the Party 
trumps fidelity to profession, religion, ethnicity and even nation.  
According to this political logic, when Party members misbehave, the matter would be 
more politically significant than legally relevant and jiwei enjoys supremacy in 
investigating and punishing delinquent members.
10
 The Party’s anti-corruption system 
serves primarily the objectives of reinforcing political discipline and enhancing political 
loyalty through punishing individual members.
11
 Party discipline has its unique historical 
meaning and political significance. The first internal disciplinary department of the Party 
was set up in April 1927 in a direct response to the white terror perpetrated by the 
Nationalist government. On 12 April 1927, the Nationalist government launched a brutal 
attack on the young Chinese Communist Party, leading to mass murder and mass arrest. 
The brutality also led to defection of Party members on a massive scale. To regroup and 
to cope with an existential threat, the Party set up a high level Supervisory Committee 
(zhongyang jianshi weiyuanhui中央监察委员会) - a ten member committee independent 
of, and parallel to, the Central Committee of the Party. Although the power and remit of 
the Supervisory Committee was substantially reduced in 1928, its legacy has remained to 
this day as a disciplinary mechanism, serving the powerful function to eliminate Party 
members who have betrayed the Party and punish those who have violated Party rules. 
12
 
Whenever the Party perceives a major crisis, its disciplinary inspection department would 
come to the fore stage, gaining more political prominence and power and playing a more 
direct role in political control. In the post-cultural revolution era, when the Party was 
determined to abandon revolution in favor of modernization, it restored and strengthened 
the Supervisory committee to rebuild the Party’s integrity and credibility.13 In response to 
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the political crisis in the aftermath of the 1989 student movement, the Party, in 1993, 
merged the Ministry of Supervision, which was in charge of administrative complaints, 
into the disciplinary system and also placed the entire anti-corruption enforcement, 
including the legal institutions, under the Party’s direct leadership. From that year 
onward, the Party, through the Central Committee for Disciplinary Inspection (“CCDI”), 
together with Committees of Disciplinary Inspection (“CDI”) at the local levels, has 
taken a hands-on approach in defining, controlling and punishing corruption. The Xi’s 
government used anticorruption as an effective entry point into a governance reform, and 
has once again enhanced the political power of jiwei in controlling Party members more 
effectively and directly.
14
 Therefore, the more serious corruption is perceived to be, the 
more political power the CCDI is able to accumulate. It is in that context that one 
appreciates the symbolic value of Wang Qishan’s visit, upon assuming the role as the 
CCDI Secretary, to the historical site of the first Supervisory Committee in Wuhan where 
he laid a wreath before the statues of the ten members of the 1927 committee. 
15
     
The Party is firmly in charge of the anti-corruption institutions. It sets agendas, designs 
institutions, prioritizes issues and determines the scope and pace of the enforcement. The 
Party’s disciplinary institutions and measures, as demonstrated in the recent anti-
corruption campaign, have shown three institutional features.
16
   
The first is the leading role of jiwei in investigating corruption cases that are committed 
by senior Party officials within the respective Party’s hierarchy. Jiwei performs multiple 
functions in preventing corruption and enforcing Party discipline but a defining 
characteristic is its near monopoly over the investigation of corrupt officials of a certain 
rank and the disposal of those cases. With little exception, major corruption scandals are 
all first investigated by jiwei. In investigating major corruption cases, jiwei leads and 
legal institutions comply.     
Jiwei reaches out to all Party and state organs. A significant recent development is 
extending the reach of the CCDI into core state institutions, including the State Council, 
the NPC, the CPPCC, and the key political institutions such as the powerful Organization 
Department. This extension has the potential to undermine a fragile functional separation 
of powers and to further expand the CCDI’s political power. The CCDI regularly 
dispatches disciplinary officials to be stationed in ministries and, under the new initiative, 
the CCDI has been sending disciplinary officials directly to the highest organs of state 
and political power and placing those organs under the direct supervision of the CCDI. 
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This is said to be an unprecedented move and which will significantly enhance the 
control of the Party over state bodies.
17
 
The structured and systematic control is reinforced by the Central Inspection Groups 
(CIG), an ad hoc high level working group dispatched from Beijing to review 
disciplinary matters of state entities at the provincial and ministerial levels. This is the 
second institutional feature. The CIG was originated in the 1990s to compensate for the 
institutional inertia on the part of the provincial/ministerial jiwei, and was aimed at 
catalyzing and reenergizing the anti-corruption endeavours. The CIG was revitalized 
under Xi and under the able leadership of Wang Qishan. In a short period of time, the 
CIG has become a sharp instrument in breaking up corrupt networks and syndicates, real 
or perceived, within the Party and has the potential to effect substantial change within the 
political system toward a “clean” government.  
If jiwei itself is an extraordinary anti-corruption mechanism that is imposed on the legal 
mechanism, the CIG represents another layer of enforcement on the Party’s own 
disciplinary mechanism. In that sense, the CIG is a non-institutional mechanism at the 
disposal of the Party leaders to solve the agency problem, seeking policy compliance at 
the provincial level. As such, it is regarded as a disruptive intrusion into the regular 
exercise of disciplinary authority within the Party.  
Briefly, the CIG serves three functions. First, it uncovers and investigates corruption 
cases within the powerful state organs and SOEs. The CIG’s work is case driven – that is 
to receive complaints and conduct preliminary investigation in relation to those 
complaints. The CIG is able to uncover major corruption cases because as agents of the 
highest authority of the Party, CIG investigators wield significant political power to 
overcome local and bureaucratic resistance in conducting investigations, serving as an 
effective forward guard to exposing corrupt networks.  
Second, the CIG is to create a downward political pressure and cascade effect so that 
jiwei at the provincial and sub-provincial levels would be sufficiently incentivized to act 
more aggressively to pursue local corruption (just as the CCDI does at the provincial 
level). From this perspective, the CIG is not principally interested in any of the cases that 
come directly to its attention but to pressurize local actors through case investigation. 
This can be seen with responsibility mechanism that Wang Qishan posits:  following a 
successful CCDI’s investigation, the CCDI would take action against both the corrupt 
officials under investigation and the officials of the relevant CDIs for failure to take 
action.  By holding local CDIs responsible, the CIG inspection is expected to incentivize 
local CDIs to act as aggressively as the CCDI.  
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Beyond holding local CDIs responsible, the CIG aims to reinforce the Party’s political 
control over Party members. Through the high profile inspection tours, the CIG enhances 
the power and status of the central authority, and ensures the smooth implementation of 
central decisions. It has been made clear that the anti-corruption regime has served as the 
most effective tool in swinging the gravitas of political power firmly into Xi’s hands.  
Finally, there is the institutional feature of shuanggui 
18– the de facto detention for the 
investigation of Party officials above certain ranks for violating Party rules during which 
an explanation at a designated place and time will be demanded. Shuanggui is a highly 
controversial measure that has caused heated debate in China and abroad. Without doubt, 
shuanggui is a form of extra legal detention and a clear violation of the state constitution 
and domestic law.
19
 But is it justifiable and politically feasible? 
There are various views on the legality of shuanggui depending on the particular 
conceptualization of the Party/state relationship. For Backer and Wang who are prepared 
to elevate the Party’s Constitution to a status equivalent to the state constitution, 20 
shuanggui is a measure to discipline Party members to ensure the integrity of the Party in 
power. Thus, shuanggui is politically legitimate even if it is in clear violation of the state 
constitution and legal rules. For others who believe otherwise, the Party must operate 
under the state constitution, and shuanggui, as an aberration to be used to place 
corruption under control, can only be excused on the grounds of urgency and necessity. 
As corruption is an entrenched and persistent political problem touching the highest 
levels of the political power, it has posed an existential threat to the Party state and must 
be dealt with forcefully and effectively. Legal institutions are weak facing powerful but 
corrupt syndicates and it takes the Party, with its wherewithal, to punish its powerful 
delinquent members. The urgency of the matter, coupled with weak legal institutions, 
creates the necessity for the Party to deal with the corruption expediently outside the legal 
frameworks through shuanggui – a special and temporary power that is tailor-made to 
suppress corruption despite being itself an aberration,.
21
   
The combined effect of jiwei, CIG and shuanggui makes anti-corruption crackdowns an 
internal affair of the Party, and this may itself be a problem. Because of the highly 
political nature of high profile cases, the enforcement is seen to be selective, secretive, 
largely extra-legal, and in any event politically biased, with a clear agenda of rooting out 
political adversaries and of legitimizing existing political power. Seen from this 
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perspective, one may be tempted to note an emerging Chinese model reflecting the 
unique political landscape of the Party state. 
What has been neglected, however, is the fact that this model, to be effective, shares 
some fundamental characteristics with certain admirable anticorruption models in other 
countries. Once the focus of the inquiry is shifted from legitimacy and legality to 
implementation and effectiveness, there is a different perspective on the disciplinary 
inspection mechanism.   
In measuring the success of Hong Kong’s well-known Independent Commission Against 
Corruption (“ICAC”), researchers have pointed out conditions that are necessary for a 
successful anti-corruption institution: an independent anti-corruption agency with strong 
political and financial support along with dedicated and professional staff. 
22
 Equally, 
international anti-corruption practices emphasize the importance of independence, 
authority, resources and the effectiveness of anti-corruption bodies. 
23
    
In respect of China, the jiwei is certainly independent of the organizations and individuals 
they monitor, investigate and punish; jiwei enjoys a high political status and exercises 
extensive powers. It is a very hierarchical system with rigid upward accountability. Local 
interference, while it continues to exist, is becoming increasingly difficult.
24
  On top of its 
high political status and relative autonomy from local authorities, jiwei also has the 
resources needed to carry out investigations. As a Party organ, jiwei may have only 
limited legal powers and institutional capacity in actual anticorruption investigations, but 
the real strength of jiwei is the leadership it commands over the entire political and legal 
apparatuses of the anti-corruption. When needed, jiwei can pool together resources of 
state organizations. In most, if not all, of the jiwei’s operations, the CDI or CCDI heavily 
relies on the legal and law enforcement professionals, including the police, procurators 
and judges, using the legal authority that these professionals may exercise to conduct the 
investigation. This centralized system, supported by the highest political authority and 
armed with effective investigative tools, has been effective in containing the spread of 
corruption in China. The achievement to date under Xi is impressive, representing the 
most serious purge since the end of the Cultural Revolution – all done in the name of, and 
through, the disciplinary inspection system. 
25
 
 
The point of departure, however, as the critics are quick in pointing out, is the context in 
which an anti-corruption agency operates. In Hong Kong, the ICAC is embedded and 
operates within a legal framework in which the ICAC is made accountable to the 
legislature, the judiciary and the community at large. Accountability is indeed an integral 
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part of the ICAC’s efficiency and is one of the reasons for the ICAC’s effectiveness. The 
rule of law which constrains the ICAC also gives it credibility.  
There is a sharp difference between the mainland’s and Hong Kong’s anti-corruption 
regimes: China’s anti-corruption regime is intertwined with her political system, which is 
based on political expedience, while the Hong Kong’s regime is steeped in her legal 
system, which is based on the rule of law. The question is, in the long run, can China’s 
Party-driven anti-corruption model evolve into something that is based on the rule of law 
and is legally accountable?  Before we move to discuss that possibility, let us first 
examine China’s dual anti-corruption system. 
 
II. China’s Dual Anti-Corruption System  
The disciplinary inspection system, as powerful as it is, does not function in isolation. It 
is an elite part of a much larger anti-corruption system. China operates a dual anti-
corruption system in which the Party’s disciplinary mechanism co-exists with a legal 
system for anti-corruption enforcement. These are distinct institutions with different 
historical origins and political ideology.
26
  
A dual system posits that regular and routine issues will be handled by the “ordinary” 
system while exceptional, and largely political, matters will be handled by the 
“extraordinary” system. Historically, the Maoist theory of contradictions conceptualizes 
two types of contradictions: the first is those among the people and the second is those 
between the people and their enemies. Indeed, this dualism is dictated by Article 1 of the 
Chinese Constitution 
27
and is visible in both political and legal theories and practices. Pils 
has pointed out the co-existence between the “state of norms” and the “state of measures” 
in analyzing state repression of human rights lawyers;
28
 and Sapio has offered a broader 
analytical framework between normal and exceptional states in exploring social ordering 
in China.
29
 Distinct types of cases are treated differently because of their political 
sensitivity and ramification.    
This dualism is firmly institutionalized in anti-corruption enforcement: a political 
mechanism which is dominated by jiwei in enforcing Party rules and a legal mechanism 
which is operated by the procuratorate according to legal provisions. Each mechanism 
has its own sphere of influences, institutional design, operating procedures, and political 
logic. The anti-corruption dualism also demands that the two mechanisms interface with 
each other and in the process affect one another. While the disciplinary mechanism brings 
political factors to bear in the legal process, the legal mechanism also produces a legal 
impact within jiwei, affecting the organizational structure and the procedural rules of the 
latter. As well, legal actors strive to enforce anti-corruption rules independent of the jiwei 
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system. To better understand the “extraordinary” part of the system (that is, the political 
mechanism operated by jiwei), one therefore needs to study it in relation to the “ordinary” 
part of the system (that is, the legal mechanism enforced by the prosecutorate). A 
comprehensive theory of the Chinese legal system, including the anti-corruption regime, 
needs to pay more attention to “ordinary” justice (see Liebman, Ch[], pp.[] ).  
Largely due to the Soviet influence, the procuratorate investigates and prosecutes 
offences committed by civil servants in their official capacity, including corruption. 
Between 1979 and 1993, China had built an anti-corruption regime within her legal 
system, which had operated in parallel to the political mechanism of the day (i.e. jiwei). 
Under the Criminal Procedure Law 1979, the procuratorate was in charge of the anti-
corruption investigation and a special investigative unit called “Economic Crime Unit” 
was set up within each level of the procuratorate to conduct anti-corruption 
investigations. While the level of institutionalization was low, and resources and 
institutional autonomy of the “Economic Crime Unit” were limited, the procuratorate, 
while under the firm leadership of the Party, nevertheless operated with a high degree of 
independence from the jiwei system. Jiwei restricted itself primarily to internal 
disciplinary matters within the Party and was not allowed to exercise any coercive 
powers, such as search, seizure or detention that are necessary for criminal 
investigation.
30
 
In the aftermath of the June 4
th
 1989 bloodshed, the Party responded to the call for more 
effective anti-corruption enforcement. Against a national anti-corruption campaign, 
Guangdong province proposed a new institution. Inspired by the success of the ICAC in 
Hong Kong, a young and ambitious Xiao Yang, a deputy procuratorate-general of 
Guangdong, proposed the creation of an independent anti-corruption bureau – i.e. the 
Anti-Corruption Authority (“ACA”). This new bureau would bring the task of anti-
corruption enforcement into sharp focus and its enhanced status would give it more 
resources and power. In the aftermath of June 4
th
 protest, there was strong support for 
institutional innovation from both the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), 
especially from the then SPP President, Liu Fuzhi, and the Guangdong Party Committee. 
As a result, the ACA was set up within the Guangdong Procuratorate on August 18th, 
1989. Following Guangdong, anticorruption bureaux were created in other parts of the 
country and, on November 10
th
, 1995, the SPP set up the National Anti-Corruption 
Authority (反贪污贿赂总局, “NACA”).31 Clearly, the political control exerted by the 
CCDI over anti-corruption enforcement did not prevent the gradual institutionalization of 
anti-corruption enforcement within the legal system.  
What is the actual working relationship between jiwei and the ACA? There are different 
ways to analyze the dependence of the legal system on the political mechanism (i.e. 
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jiwei). First, jiwei has the near monopoly of major cases, cases that involve senior 
officials – while the legal system handles relevantly minor corruption cases. Hence jiwei 
and its related institution, the CDI, is known for tackling the “tigers” while the legal 
system and its related institution, the ACA, handles the “flies”. As such, serious cases of 
corruption are first investigated nearly in their entirety by jiwei.  
In 1994, the Party authorized the jiwei to undertake coercive measures, including 
detention, on its own delinquent members during anti-corruption investigations.
32
 
Relying on those coercive measures, jiwei has been able to exert its jurisdiction over most 
of the major corruption cases. Only a tiny percentage of cases are referred to the ACA for 
criminal investigation and prosecution.
33
 
Most of the more routine corruption offences committed by lower-ranking officials, 
especially at the intervals of major anti-corruption campaigns, are routinely handled by 
the ACA. It is no surprise, however, that most corruption offences occur at the basic level 
of the government and most prosecutions against corruption are initiated by the ACA at 
corresponding level. While jiwei has resources – the CCDI certainly has more resources 
than the NACA of the SPP in terms of political authority, manpower, and other resources 
– the CDI lacks resources at the lower levels of China’s governmental and political 
hierarchy. Put simply, the institutional design allows the CCDI and the CDI at the 
provincial level to take on large and important corruption cases, but the Party has to rely 
on the ACA to mainstream the anti-corruption initiatives and to take action against the 
vast majority of the corruption cases at the lower levels.      
A second way to conceptualize the jiwei-ACA relationship is to place the ACA’s 
operation within the long shadow of the CDI’s leadership. From this perspective, the 
ACA and the entire legal system play a supplementary role in the grand anti-corruption 
design of the Party.  
There are different ways in which the ACA may play that supplementary role. As 
mentioned, jiwei may refer cases to the ACA for investigation and prosecution, and those 
cases are given priority in the procuratorate. Jiwei may also request the ACA’s 
assistance, in particular to borrow the ACA’s coercive powers, in cases that are under 
jiwei investigation. On the flip side, the ACA may proactively participate in a jiwei 
investigation so as to take advantage of jiwei’s procedures (such as treating confessions 
extracted by the jiwei as its own in addition to giving confessions the necessary legal 
effect or relying on shuanggui detention to bypass the time limit placed on pre-trial 
detention).        
 
III. Anti-corruption enforcement and the Rule of Law  
The dual system thesis offers a useful perspective to understand the political role of the 
jiwei in the larger context of anti-corruption enforcement.  While this is so, is it 
sustainable in the Chinese political context? To answer this question, the following 
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analysis places the evolution of the anti-corruption regime in China within the larger 
context of China’s fast-changing legal system.    
As with China’s governmental budget,34 Chinese law also comes in different varieties. 
Broadly, there is the official/formal law made pursuant to the Constitution. There is also 
quasi-formal extra law with questionable legality and constitutionality. Parallel to law 
and extra-law, one also finds a visible layer of informal “extra-extra law”, which has been 
developing a life of its own. There are two perspectives on those varieties of law. From 
an empirical perspective, they co-exist and are simultaneously present in different areas 
of Chinese law, particularly public law and criminal law. In anti-corruption enforcement, 
legal institutions are certainly at work but certain extra-extra law practices and 
mechanisms have become institutionalized. Still, it is extra law that has played a leading 
role in the field and exerted overarching control. 
The varieties can also be viewed in evolutionary terms. Over the past three decades, the 
space within which extra law operates in every aspect of Chinese law has, in general, 
been shrinking while, correspondingly, the space within which law operates has been 
expanding.
35
 Extra-extra legal practices, while continuing to exist, have become largely 
exceptional. The following sections of this chapter will discuss the extra-extra law, extra 
law and law in the context of China’s anti-corruption regime. 
 
Extra-extra Law 
Extra-extra law comprises of government measures that exist in some dark space, 
seemingly unrelated to any legal framework and devoid of any legal authority. Extra-
extra law is an informal political institution characterized by a total lack of legality. It is 
used to advance some predatory and repressive government policies which cannot be 
justified by any law or policies. As such, extra-extra law is mired in secrecy and operates 
without legal accountability. Except for occasional and indirect admissions, such as the 
quasi-official admission of the existence of “black jails” for petitioners and religious 
offenders,
36
 extra-extra law does not officially exist, and, as such, it survives and 
sometimes thrives because it is effective in achieving certain policy goals that cannot 
otherwise be achieved through law or extra-law. The legal system in China is regarded as 
weak and ineffective when it comes to sensitive issues, and, in these situations, extra-
extra law expedites the process to the extent that it has become indispensable. 
Examples abound. “Black jails” have also been used to detain peasants in violation of 
family planning policies or those who fail to pay illicit levies; to detain and intimidate 
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petitioners who air their grievances in Beijing; and, more recently, to detain Tibetan 
monks for their alleged challenges to the official policy on religions. These repressive 
policies are extra-extra law because powers are exercised by the government on an ad 
hoc basis without any legal authorization or procedure, and with little accountability. The 
forced disappearance of human rights lawyers in 2011 and those who openly supported 
Hong Kong occupying movement well illustrated official law’s vulnerability and the 
readiness of the Party to resort to extra-extra law. Lawyers and other advocates were 
typically snatched by internal security authorities and detained in unknown places for 
interrogation and intimidation.
37
  
There is a fundamental difference between disappearance (i.e. extra-extra law) and abuse 
of criminal procedure (i.e. law). When the government uses, or even abuses, the law, the 
government still signals a commitment to law. Using or abusing the law  also eschews a 
degree of legal accountability, publicity and responsibility. This is the reason why the 
incarcerated human rights lawyers and many others have demanded their day in court so 
that abuses could be brought to the attention of the law and public scrutiny. A mere legal 
trapping may not be sufficient to convert a political persecution to a fair legal process, but 
it is a necessary first step in developing legal accountability against arbitrary power.  
Legal rhetoric is important in both justifying and constraining state powers. It may not be 
possible to reduce law to total irrelevance without incurring cost. The judicial 
interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) on the application of sedition and 
subversion to the 1989 democratic movement activists;
38
 the legal trappings that the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the SPC painstakingly 
created to justify its prosecution of the Falun Gong;
39
 and, the courtroom tension between 
judges and lawyers in some of the Falun Gong trials
40
 are all examples that law matters 
even at a repressive moment. The mere fact that a criminal charge is mounted necessarily 
means a degree of accountability. The path of law is a tortuous one, but as long as this is 
the path to tread, there exists some degree of legal control and accountability that cannot 
simply be swept away. 
Another reason as to why law is important is because extra-extra law serves a 
fundamentally different objective. Enforced disappearance or “black jails” differs from 
criminal punishment in fundamental ways. In criminal punishment, the law addresses 
past offences and the objective is to punish the wrongdoers. In enforced disappearance, 
the focus is instead on the “risk” that an individual poses, regardless of the offences he or 
she may or may not have committed. Extra-extra law is thus applied not for the purpose 
of punishing past offences, but to reduce future risk, with targeted measures taken against 
individuals to maximize intimidation. 
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Torture, for example, may also be used in both law and extra-extra law. But in law, 
torture is typically used to extract confession to establish criminal liability; while in 
extra-extra law, it is to inflict fear so that those who are tortured would not speak or act 
out. Intimidation is therefore at the core of the extra-extra law. As such, in the enforced 
disappearance cases, no general norms apply; instead, the users of extra-extra law apply 
particularized stratagems, tailor-made for each individual case. With intimidation at the 
center of the equation, we see a quantitative change in the method of repression with a 
sudden turn against law.
41
 
On the anti-corruption front, internal discipline has been a core instrument to maintain 
Party integrity and reinforce Party loyalty. Historically, the jiwei had the much broader 
remit in enforcing party rule and had been ruthless in doing so. The Party’s disciplinary 
mechanism is not to enforce the criminal law but to deal with the risk party members 
might pose to the Party. The mechanism is to apply Party’s rules in a highly political 
fashion. This is a fundamental difference between legal enforcement of anti-corruption 
law and the Party’s application of internal rules.  
The application of extra-extra law may be surgical and limited in its scope of application 
and in the degree of brutality. But these may not be the core issues. The core questions 
are: Is China moving towards a different doctrine of governance in the name of the a 
“Chinese model” where legal constraints are regarded as redundant and ineffective and 
power is unconstrained so long as objectives are to be achieved?   
Repressive episodes are recurring events in the post-Mao era, and each generation of 
leaders have their repressive moments during their terms, especially towards the end of 
their terms when they hand power over to the next generation of leaders. Deng Xiaoping 
sent tanks to suppress the 1989 democratic movements and Jiang Zemin smashed the 
Falun Gong and wiped out the China Democracy Party (CDP), incarcerating most of the 
CDP members for lengthy terms. Similarly, Hu Jingtao crushed the Chartist movement in 
2008 and then the so-called Jasmine Revolution and took a generally repressive approach 
towards governance in the name of harmony and stability.
42
 Xi is most forceful in 
silencing dissent political or otherwise. In contrast, new leaders, as they emerge to power, 
appear to be politically open and reform minded. This appearance enhances expectations 
and invites challenges.
43
 Once that happens, however, the new leaders typically move 
decisively to demolish the challenges, creating their repressive moments and leaving a 
conservative legacy.  
Extra Law 
The Party and the government have largely relied on extra law to exercise their powers.  
Extra law is a system and a normative order in which power is neither directly derived 
from clear legal rules and exercised through properly constituted authorities nor subject 
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to independent oversight (judicial or otherwise) outside the Party. In contrast with law, 
extra law does not allow deliberation, representation, transparency or decision making 
that can be regarded as judicial. Extra law has a strong political or policy orientation and 
the whole system is geared to informal practice, political expediency or mere 
administrative convenience. China’s legal reform in the past 30 years is characterized by 
a slow transition from extra law to law. Yet, after more than 30 years of law reform and 
improved legality, the effect of extra law still looms large, especially in core policy areas, 
such as criminal law and public law.  
Examples of extra law also abound. The first example is criminal law. A significant 
proportion of criminal justice matters are still governed by extra-law. There has been a 
large gray area when it comes to police powers to punish. Due to ideological commitment 
and historical legacy, criminal law punishes only “serious offences”, leaving “minor 
offences” to the prerogatives of the police. While approximately one million criminal 
cases go through the criminal justice process each year, more than 10 million offenses of 
different severity and nature are dealt with administratively by the police in the name of 
punishment, treatment or rehabilitation. The hodgepodge of administrative penalties 
targets prostitutes, drug addicts and a wide range of minor offenders, and the penalties 
may vary from a verbal warning to incarceration for prostitutes and those who visit 
prostitutes. This administrative punishment regime is characterized by relative severity in 
penalty, lack of representation and due process and, in some cases, uncertain legislative 
authorization. 
44
 
But rule by extra-law is not limited to the field of criminal law. Another example is 
media governance. Media governance is essentially a lawless business in China. China’s 
legislature has yet to be allowed to pass a single law to govern the media, which is wholly 
state-owned and controlled tightly by the Party. Instead, the media is controlled through a 
well-established political mechanism, armed with strong organizations and detailed 
procedures, to guide and manage all media outlets in China on an on-going basis. Media 
governance is particularly an area in which Party norms and organs, instead of legal rules 
and institutions, act as the ultimate authority. 
Extra law has also been extensively used in other regulatory fields, such as tax policy, 
state secrecy and securities regulation, in which significant issues such as imposition of 
tax, designation of state secrets, and regulation of insider trading, are subject to internal 
and often informal rules without clear legislative authorization, a degree of transparency 
and necessary legal accountability.
45
   
The Party’s anti-corruption regime, including jiwei, the CIG and shuanggui, is a typical 
extra-law design. The Party’s leadership rule is constitutionally entrenched and cannot be 
challenged through any legal measure. The supreme position of the Party necessarily 
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means that the Party’s rules have certain constitutional legitimacy even though these rules 
exist entirely outside the legal system of the state. Yet, when the Party has elevated its 
internal rules to the status of quasi-state law and has placed Party governance and state 
governance on a compatible footing, it is difficult to simply regard Party rules as 
constitutionally and legally irrelevant.
46
 
 
Law 
The rule of law has once again become a rallying point for China’s new round of 
political-legal reform with the Party pronouncing an unprecedented commitment to 
developing the socialist legal system.
47
 With that new initiative as the backdrop, there has 
been renewed concern about the legality of the jiwei investigation, especially the use of 
shuanggui against Party members without following legal procedures, and the effort to 
move the extra-legal practices into a more proper legal framework. Extra law may be fit 
for crisis management during a transitional period. But it is not sustainable if used as a 
regular governance tool.   
Nevertheless, China has been building a legal order based on law since the late 1970s, 
and the achievement is most pronounced in civil and commercial law. Chinese public law 
has also witnessed a gradual, albeit contradictory, process in enhancing regularity, 
transparency, and juridification. Even in criminal law which is traditionally police-centric 
and highly politicized, there has been a tendency toward increasing certainty, more 
effective judicial oversight, and stronger legal representation.
48
 Building a legal order is a 
long endeavor and China has experienced periodical setbacks and frustration in the 
process. But the larger trend had been clear: the sphere of law had been expanding, 
reaching out to and occupying more fields;
49
 and formal rules are occupying more 
commanding heights in governance in relation to extra-legal rules and practices. The Xi 
government has, in particular, encouraged the expansion and empowerment of legal 
institutions in dispute resolution so as to bring more social problems to effective legal 
resolution. As a result, the legal system is likely to be more autonomous and effective 
and, in the long run, while the Party will remain “hands-on” in politically sensitive cases, 
the Party’s willingness and ability to intervene in the vast majority of cases are likely to 
diminish further.   
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There are several reasons that explain the possibility of a gradual but decisive shift from 
the jiwei-based political mechanism to a legal-centric mechanism in controlling 
corruption in China. The jiwei system as it stands is relatively new. As mentioned earlier, 
the current jiwei-centric model came into being as part of the crisis management in the 
aftermath of the 1989 student movement and it was specifically set up to address 
corruption. While the Party launched a brutal crackdown against the democratic 
component of the student movement, the Party kept the anticorruption component alive 
by launching one of the largest campaigns against corruption. As part of that campaign, 
the Party imposed the supremacy of Party in anti-corruption matters by bringing the ACA 
and other related agencies under jiwei’s leadership. The clear objective was to 
consolidate the diverse resources and to develop a stronger institutional capacity in both 
policy making and operation.  
The current campaign was also made in response to a political crisis faced by the Xi 
government.
50
 But as the political risk that corruption poses wanes, and as the crisis 
withers (as it naturally will happen), the Party is likely to shift its focus from combating 
corruption to a reformist agenda. Once the current wave of anti-corruption investigation 
and prosecution diminishes, and once the “tigers” have been hunted down, corruption 
would be perceived as a lesser political risk and anti-corruption would no longer attract 
the highest political attention. The investigation would be less proactive, focusing more 
on individuals than their political affiliations and on cases that have taken place at lower 
levels of the government. Thus, sooner or later, jiwei would declare its anti-corruption 
campaign a victory and, with the number of corruption-related prosecutions declining, 
shift its priority from investigation to institution-capacity building with a focus on 
education and prevention. When that happens, anti-corruption is likely to be less a 
highly-charged political campaign and more of a matter of routine law enforcement.  
There have been some subtle changes in jiwei’s operations, which indicate a certain 
surprising deference to the legal system. Jiwei, for example, has refrained from using 
terms such as “cases” to highlight the fact that what jiwei handles is no more than 
complaints. Jiwei has come out to state that while there is overlap between jiwei and the 
legal system, the former is not expected to replace the latter. Wang Qishan himself has, 
reportedly, made the philosophical concession that, “give back to the law the law and to 
the Party disciplinary system Party discipline.”51 Jiwei’s work is not to handcuff corrupt 
officials, according to Wang, but to enforce party discipline.  
The gradual but visible legal-centric reform is also likely to shift the gravitas from jiwei 
to the ACA, while the latter is developing more credibility and capacity. For one, the 
ACA is likely to better its treatment of the persons it prosecutes. Part of the reasons why 
corrupt officials “voluntarily” stay with the shuanggui system is that shuanggui offers 
certain advantage and benefits that the legal system fails to offer: the food is better, the 
accommodation is more comfortable, there is little public embarrassment, and there is 
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much less chance for  actual criminal prosecution beyond the Party discipline.
52
 Of 
course, this is all possible because the CCDI is politically of higher status than the NACA 
and commands more authority. 
The institutional advantage that the regular criminal justice system has in comparison 
with shuanggui is negligible. The first advantage is that, while there is no clear-cut time 
limit for detention under shuanggui, there is a time limit for detention in the criminal 
process. But this advantage is minor. Criminal detention could also be lengthy and the 
conditions in detention facilities are brutal. The second advantage is that while there is a 
no access to lawyer for shuanggui, an accused in the criminal process is entitled to legal 
advice and representation.  But before legal representation becomes genuinely useful and 
effective, legal representation is limited at the pre-trial stage.   
If the on-going legal reform can place the court at the center of the criminal justice 
system for the vast majority of the cases,  the comparative advantages of shuanggui may  
diminish further and the comparative attraction of the legal system would increase. When 
more weight is given to lawyers’ legal advice and representation, and when fair trials are 
ensured because courts are more independent, then the incentive structure would change 
and the gravitas will shift to court trials. This will lead to the decline of jiwei in anti-
corruption matters. The comfortable detention experienced by those put under shuanggui 
may even have a positive impact on the ordinary criminal justice system just as fortress 
confinement eventually enhanced the standard of criminal justice in the Europe.
53
 
Another important reason to explain a possible shift from jiwei to the criminal justice 
system (i.e. ACA) is that the political system has started to resemble a legal system where 
the jiwei’s substantive rules and investigative procedures are concerned. The recent 
reform to promote the rule of law within the Party is likely to engender regularity, 
professionalism, institutionalization, and, above all, compliance with constitutional and 
legal rules. The CCDI, for example, has limited the duration of shuanggui detention and 
made the time limit compatible with that under criminal procedure rules. The Party has 
also re-designed its disciplinary procedures to offer a degree of protection of the rights of 
individual Party members so that the Party’s internal disciplinary process is similar in 
form, if not in substance, to the legal process.
54
   
In many cases, the political mechanism is needed because it has some features that the 
legal mechanisms lack in order to effectively combat corruption. Those features, such as 
prolonged detention, are necessary to bypass the procedural constraints and have been 
shown to be effective in extracting confessions. The system allows the Party to hide 
behind the veil of Party disciplinary proceeding and to carry out an effective criminal 
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investigation in the name of Party discipline. But if the jiwei system moves closer to the 
legal mechanism and when the Party’s internal disciplinary process and the criminal 
process resemble each other in substance and in form, the disciplinary mechanism will 
lose its comparative advantage. The question then becomes: Why rely on the political 
mechanism when a legal mechanism, which is equally effective and commands greater 
legitimacy, is available? This is not to say that jiwei will disappear. There is no doubt that 
the dualism as stated above will survive and jiwei will continue to be in charge of 
investigating a limited number of cases relating to high level corruption. But the anti-
corruption gravitas is likely to shift to legal institutions for the vast majority of the cases 
as the current legal reform continues.   
 
IV. Conclusion   
The Party is firmly in charge of China’s anti-corruption institutions with jiwei setting the 
agenda and leading the investigation of major corruption cases in the name of political 
expediency. In that largely political process, legal institutions play a marginal and 
supporting role. This chapter does not deny this political reality. What this chapter does is 
to provide a cautious reminder that jiwei, as powerful as it has been in the past two 
decades, is part of a larger anti-corruption mechanism. While jiwei’s role may be 
conspicuous in governing a country in the face of a real or perceived political crisis, anti-
corruption enforcement has to achieve some form of normalcy where it will need to rely 
on legal institutions and procedures once the crisis is over. A nation-state cannot be 
perpetually ruled on the presumption that the state is facing a crisis, and the Party has to 
allow the legal system to take over and to offer necessary predictability, certainty, and 
legitimacy.  Corruption is a crime common to all human societies. While the syndrome of 
corruption may differ in different regime types, corruption can be uniformly explained by 
the lack of effective control over power and wealth and institutions designed to control 
corruption.
55
 There are successful anti-corruption institutional designs to enhance the 
accountability and control that have been well-tested and China, despite its unique 
characteristics, does not present an exceptional case in the long run.
56
   
This chapter focuses on the cooperation and to a lesser degree the competition between 
the politically driven anti-corruption system, or jiwei, and a more legal-centric anti-
corruption system, arguing for the possibility that, with some exceptions, China has the 
potential to develop fully a legal-centric anti-corruption regime in the long run. There is 
no reason that China cannot create a single, unitary anti-corruption body as independent, 
effective and powerful as the ICAC in Hong Kong. The ACA can operate independently 
of the CDI on a rigid separation of powers and functions. Historically, the ACA operated 
with more political independence prior to the 1993 centralization and, at that point in 
time, there was  a genuine effort on the part of the procuratorate to achieve more 
institutional autonomy on matters relating to anti-corruption enforcement.   
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In the meantime, the procuratorate has struggled to maintain its institutional autonomy 
and integrity and indeed, the ACA has resiliently resisted further attempts by the jiwei of 
a more structural fusion. Given that the independence of the procuratorate and ACA from 
jiwei is constitutionally enshrined, this is the reason why attempts at  incorporating the 
ACA into jiwei framework have not worked – and were never meant to work. The 
procuratorate may have humbly deferred to jiwei’s instructions where anti-corruption 
policies and investigation is concerned, particularly in rendering assistance to jiwei when 
jiwei carries out its own investigations, but the ACA has always tried to maintain its 
institutional autonomy. Therefore, the ACA’s own operations have never been replaced 
by the jiwei’s.  
A single system, which allows jiwei certain discretion in enforcing Party discipline but 
leaves criminal investigation, at least for the vast majority of  corruption cases, to the 
ACA, would be the most optimal design even for China’s authoritarian system. There are 
earlier signs that China may be moving toward that direction. The newly revised Criminal 
Procedural Law has given the ACA the power to detain persons in major corruption 
cases, and this power was modeled precisely on shuanggui so that in cases where  a 
genuine need to extend pre-trial investigation exists the ACA could rely on clear legal 
authority instead of relying on shuanggui. Furthermore, the anti-corruption legal 
institutions, the NCAC in particular, may be able to gain more political clout. Since the 
end of 2014, the ACA has undergone another round of institutional reform. With the 
endorsement of the Party, the SPP merged another two departments with the NACA to 
form an anti-corruption agency at the vice-ministerial level.
57
 Under the new design, the 
NCAC is to have a higher administrative rank headed by a more senior procurator. It will 
also have more manpower and other resources in view of internal restructuring. 
Researchers need to pay more attention to the potential juridification of China’s anti-
corruption regime in which law is prepared to fill the gap that the Party mechanism may 
eventually leave vacant. 
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